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Explorations of the Justice Department into the Labor
Exemption
Abbott B. Lipsky, Jr.*
The basic structure of the labor/antitrust interface, as perceived
by the Antitrust Division can be understood in the following way:
Free market competition is the fundamental economic policy of
the nation, and the antitrust laws are the statutory expression of
that policy. There are various exceptions and exemptions from this
policy - regions of economic activity that Congress has chosen to
exempt from antitrust rules. Generally, where the actors in some
segment of the economy have been exempted from the antitrust
laws and from the pressures of competition, Congress has replaced
those laws with some regulating force to protect the public from
such anticompetitive abuses as the freedom from competitive pres-
sures would otherwise allow. Examples of this pattern that come to
mind are the recently repealed regulations of the civil aviation in-
dustry by the Civil Aeronautics Board and the recently relaxed
regulations of the domestic trucking industry by the Interstate
Commerce Commission. One finds another common characteristic
of these forms of regulation: generally, the fundamental goal of
regulation in those industries is to replicate the results of competi-
tion under circumstances where it is thought that competition it-
self is not feasible for that purpose. Labor is a field in which one
finds a scheme of federal regulation replacing ordinary competitive
rules, to some extent, but that does not share the goal of repli-
cating the results of competition.
There was a day when one could look at section 6 of the Clayton
Act,1 which states that the labor of a human being is not a com-
modity, and argue on the basis of that language that while laborers
may be permitted to collude in labor markets to some extent free
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1. 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1976).
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from antitrust restrictions, i.e., to associate and agree to eliminate
competition among themselves, the collusion is permissible only so
long as those laborers do not exercise market power collectively.
The collusion may not associate many workers, among many firms,
in a wide geographic area. This would be somewhat akin to the
arguments that were often made, and which are now resoundingly
rejected, regarding the Capper-Volstead Act,2 which is the basic
antitrust exemption found in the agricultural field and, as are the
antitrust exemption statutes affecting labor, a depression era stat-
ute. It provides that while the exemption may allow farmers to get
together to cooperatively market their produce, the exemption
might have been intended to permit associations as long as they do
not acquire any substantial market power. In the labor field, what
is now called the statutory exemption, might also have been read
that way. It does not seem plausible to argue that it can be read
that way anymore.
Laborers can get together to eliminate competition with respect
to wages, hours, and working conditions. They can also get to-
gether with a group of laborers sufficiently large to possess and to
exercise some market power over wages, hours, and working
conditions.
We have a regulatory scheme under the Wagner Act,3 adminis-
tered by the NLRB, that is in some sense fundamentally inconsis-
tent with the notion that the best policy is either to achieve com-
petitive market results by having a competitive market, or to
achieve competitive market results by using a regulatory scheme.
At one extreme it is granted that laborers can get together and
eliminate competition among themselves and still encounter anti-
trust problems even with a standard as generous as the statute has
been interpreted to be. Ordinarily, one does not encounter those
problems if only the laborers of one specific firm get together and
bargain collectively with the individual employer, at least where
that firm has no market power in the market in which it competes.
It will be easy enough for the competitors of that firm (if there are
such and if they are not subject to that same labor monopoly) to
force the firm that must deal with a labor monopoly out of the
market simply by competing on the basis of its lower wage rates, or
its other inferior forms of compensation. It may not be sufficient to
restrain output even if all the laborers in the particular industry
2. 7 U.S.C. §§ 291-92 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
3. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
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are in the same collective bargaining relationship with all the em-
ployers in that industry. It may instead be the case that in order to
make that monopoly effective, the labor used to produce other pro-
ductive inputs must be organized and brought within the realm of
the agreement. There are two reasons for this. First, there are
other productive inputs that can substitute for labor, and as long
as the employer is free to turn to them the monopoly power of the
laborers is inhibited in that respect. The second reason, of course,
is that as the scope of this labor monopoly broadens and as it ap-
proaches more complete success, the forces impelling laborers to
stay out of that combination may become well-nigh irresistible.
The higher the monopoly wage, the greater the reward from using
unorganized labor.
How do you get around those constraints? Perhaps a better
question is, to what extent does the current law allow evasion of
the constraints that exist on the ability of laborers to monopolize
the market for their labor? One way of solving the problem of
unionized firms' competing with non-union firms is to allow the la-
borers to agree to not deal with those non-union firms. That
clearly is an avenue toward successful labor monopolization that
the courts have not permitted and will not permit. Except in par-
ticular industries recognized by Congress as posing specific, histori-
cally less tractable labor problems, the route toward labor monopo-
lization must be through the regulated collective bargaining
process, and not by the denial of options to laborers who have no
opportunity to exercise their rights in that process. On the other
hand, to say that the line is drawn, as it is sometimes described, on
the basis that laborers cannot combine with non-labor groups or
cannot combine with groups outside the collective bargaining pro-
cess, seems clearly too facile. It seems to me that there are situa-
tions in which unions compel employers not to deal with certain
types of competitors, as distinct from laborers, where, in effect, the
combination is with a non-labor group.
There would be one easy way to allow the labor monopoly to go
as far as it is economically capable of going, and that is to pass a
law saying that if you are going to be in a specific industry, you can
only use union labor. This would clearly afford the union a means
of "cartelizing" the entire market. In fact, a union in such an in-
dustry might realize all the available monopoly profits in that mar-
ket. But it seems, as a matter of legislative policy, the latter choice
will not be made either. While our statutes seek to give labor
something more than it would have in an unregulated competitive
1983
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market, they are careful to give something less than the entire mo-
nopoly profit extractable from any particular industry or group of
industries.
So we must accept the fact that all truly definitive resolutions to
the labor/antitrust conflict which involves economic forces under-
lying the labor/antitrust interface, have been rejected. On the
other hand, we do have laws permitting laborers to combine and
"cartelize" to some extent. At the other extreme, Congress has not
yet been persuaded to pass a law saying participation in an indus-
try requires the use of unionized labor. Given the equipoise of the
contending forces, economic analysis would appear to have very lit-
tle to say about where one is going to draw the line. It is an ex-
tremely embarrassing state of affairs for an Antitrust Division that
purports to draw its legal distinctions on the basis of economic pol-
icy. You may have read about our position on resale price mainte-
nance. For example, we have black-letter law that vertical price
arrangements - the type of contract in which a manufacturer and
his retailer agree on the price at which the manufacturer's product
may be sold - are per se illegal. This rule is said to apply regard-
less of the manufacturers' lack of any market power. You may have
heard that the current leadership of the Antitrust Division believes
this rule is inappropriate because where one is supposed to be
dealing with a law whose basic purpose is to remove restraints on
competition, one should not condemn practices in circumstances in
which they simply can not be anticompetitive, and indeed in which
they might be procompetitive. In the case of most legal phenomena
- perhaps I should say most of the real world phenomena faced
by the Antitrust Division - it is possible to draw a legal distinc-
tion based on the underlying economic policy. So, for example, in
our new merger guidelines, we say that a vertical merger, a merger
between firms in a supplier/customer relationship, can be anticom-
petitive. And we say, with respect to the use of exclusive territo-
ries, that the practice can be anticompetitive in certain circum-
stances and, therefore, in those circumstances we will seek to
enjoin it or prevent its use.
But in the labor field, once you cast yourself adrift between the
two extremes I have described, i.e., once you accept some labor
monopolization, but reject complete labor monopolization, and you
approach that spectrum with a line-drawing apparatus, the out-
come is dictated once you determine to favor competitive outcomes
and to oppose monopoly outcomes. Because that is very much the
perspective of the Antitrust Division, we tend to be pushed toward
414 Vol. 21:411
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that side of the spectrum closest to the competitive outcome, or as
close as you can respectably get.
Because I have some very limited input into the process by
which the Solicitor General submits the views of the United States
to the Supreme Court in labor cases, I want to emphasize that the
Antitrust Division is not the United States for these purposes. The
General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board and the
Board itself have input into that process. The Department of La-
bor has input into that process. The theory is that the United
States speaks with one voice and the spokesman is the Solicitor
General. However, I like to think the more directly an antitrust
issue is implicated the louder we are likely to shout, but if we are
heard to any greater effect I do not know. Having said that there is
no economic policy principle that will settle questions of labor ex-
emption, and other questions arising at the labor/antitrust inter-
face, I should also mention that economic policy is not the only
thing that the Antitrust Division has in its bag of tricks. Referring
to the various regulatory schemes I mentioned at the outset, there
is a large body of law built up over the years as to what courts
should do when they find themselves confronted with a regulated
entity (an airline, trucking company, or a bank) accused of an anti-
trust violation for engaging in behavior that is arguably not in the
competition/antitrust world, but is in the regulated industry world.
Where Congress has seen fit to enact a law allowing the regulated
party to engage in certain behavior without fear of antitrust liabil-
ity, and where there is a so-called express immunity, there is no
problem. Congress can exempt industries from the antitrust laws if
it desires, and it has in fact done so on occasion. The courts gener-
ally respect such exemptions, although they are construed nar-
rowly. The more difficult issue, of course, is where the behavior
does not fall within the region expressly carved out from the anti-
trust rules by Congress, but where the activity seems to be so inti-
mately related to the statutory function of the regulators and to
the success of the regulatory program that Congress entrusted to
the regulator, that to impose antitrust liability would appear in-
consistent with what Congress intended when it established the
regulatory scheme. The institutional interest of the Antitrust Divi-
sion and, more fundamentally, the interest in efficient market allo-
cation underlying the antitrust laws, would seek to confine that so-
called implied immunity area to the minimum extent that the
courts will reasonably allow. The test has been articulated as fol-
lows: antitrust laws will be regarded as displaced only where they
1983 415
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require behavior that is "plainly repugnant" to the regulatory
scheme established by Congress, and even then only "to the mini-
mum extent necessary" to allow the regulatory scheme to function
in the basic way that Congress thought it would function.
Ordinarily, the test means that absent an express immunity, i.e.,
absent a statute specifying behavior that can be engaged in with-
out fear of antitrust liability, conduct by a regulated entity that is
anticompetitive must have been compelled by the regulatory au-
thority before the immunity will be held to attach.
Connell Construction Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local 1004
cast the Supreme Court into the role which I think under different
circumstances might have been the role of the NLRB. The Court
was asked to consider a labor practice that, if permitted, certainly
would have allowed the labor interest some incremental monopoly
power. The Supreme Court was essentially cast adrift in the vast
middle ground to which I have been referring. It did not have a
statute or an exemption that allowed it to give the complete mo-
nopoly to the labor interest. On the other hand, it had a statute
that clearly did not permit it to condemn the labor monopoly sim-
ply because it possessed some degree of market power.
Searching for some bright line standard to use in judging the
legality of the labor practice, the Court was forced to decide the
issue of legality under the antitrust laws rather than under the la-
bor laws. This gave rise to a very interesting and, I think, trouble-
some problem. If the only tool available to the Court for the pur-
pose of condemning a specific form of labor-market behavior as an
inappropriate balancing of labor and antitrust is a finding that the
practice is an antitrust violation, then the following consequence
ensues: you can go to jail for three years and pay $100,000 if you
are an individual, or pay $1,000,000 if you are a corporation. If the
Court says that the practice does not run afoul of the antitrust
laws, the issue of remedy is avoided. However, the net result of
Connell is that you fall over the abyss at the point where a viola-
tion occurs. The line the Court chose to draw in the spectrum is
not a manifestly unreasonable one. I am not sure it is the one that
should be drawn in all circumstances. Obviously there are people
in this room who would have preferred it to have been drawn in
one way or the other, but the Court in Connell seemed to be asking
simply whether the challenged conduct occurred among parties to
a legitimate collective bargaining agreement. This was not a mani-
4. 421 U.S. 616 (1975).
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festly incredible thing for them to do, since they cannot be in the
position of reconciling the subtle procompetitive and anticompeti-
tive policies which are inevitably and inherently conflicting in
every case. The lower courts would do nothing but settle labor/
antitrust claims if the Court permitted this balancing. Instead,
they found a bright line rule.
While this rule is not manifestly unworkable, the Court left us
with the question: If you engage in behavior that Connell says the
antitrust laws prohibit, does that mean you are going to go to jail
and pay treble damages to antitrust plaintiffs?
Let me leave entirely the field of labor/antitrust for the moment
and talk about another field. You may have heard recently about a
Supreme Court decision in a case called Community Communica-
tions Co. v. City of Boulder,5 which involved an allegation that a
city, a municipality, did something anticompetitive in the process
of awarding cable TV franchises. One of the cable TV franchise
competitors, feeling somewhat done in, sued the city, alleging an
antitrust violation on the part of the city. The case went to the
Supreme Court on the issue of whether cities, as cities, had an im-
munity from the antitrust laws. The answer was "no."
This leaves us with exactly the same problem in the so-called
state action area involved in Boulder that we have in the labor/
antitrust area after Connell. While I doubt that criminal or treble
damage liability would ever be imposed on a municipality perform-
ing proper municipal functions, a municipality must now worry
about whether its actions are anticompetitive. It might not worry
so much if the only result of doing something anticompetitive was
to be enjoined from so doing. What really troubles the municipali-
ties (and I have talked to some people from the National League of
Cities and I can assure you they are very troubled) is that if a
court decides that the city did something anticompetitive, and,
therefore, violative of the Sherman Act, it may be liable for crimi-
nal penalties and treble damages.
The dissenting Justices in Boulder said exactly this to the ma-
jority, who replied: "Who said anything about treble damages or
criminal liability?" This was treated by the majority as an entirely
different issue, thus suggesting very strongly in that context the
Court might be willing to find a way to say, with respect to some
anticompetitive municipal action: first, you cannot do it; second,
the antitrust laws are the reason you cannot do it; but third, no
5. 102 S. Ct. 835 (1982).
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city is going to pay treble damages and no city official is going to
go to jail.
How the Court is going to reach that result I do not know. I
sense, though, that the same kind of tension exists in the labor/
antitrust field. The Supreme Court has said: first, a labor practice
is impermissible; second, the antitrust laws are the reason it is im-
permissible. However, the remedy presents the difficult step. If you
are doing something that the antitrust laws say you should not do,
you could go to jail or pay million-dollar fines or become liable for
treble damages. Certainly much of the tension in the labor/anti-
trust field arises from precisely this problem. There seems to be
something unsettling when there are two statutes, embodying at
least potentially inconsistent standards of behavior, whose recon-
ciliation has proven in concrete cases to be a somewhat complex
undertaking. Further, the penalty for guessing incorrectly may in-
clude some very serious sanctions. One could regard that state of
affairs as satisfactory if one took the view that the harm that re-
sults from stepping over the antitrust line is especially pernicious.
If your real intention is to keep commercial behavior well away
from that line, it may be appropriate to use the threat of criminal
and treble damage liability to do so. But I sense that some of the
discomfort expressed about Connell reflects a basic notion that
this intention results in some unfairness where the suggestion im-
plied from the labor statutes is that the elimination of competition
over wages, hours, and working conditions is permissible. Connell
presents some of the same problems as the dispute concerning
whether rule of reason or per se rules will attach to antitrust deci-
sions in the labor field following denial of a motion to dismiss on
the grounds of exemption. This leads to the conclusion that it is
permissible to sail out within fairly close range of the antitrust lia-
bility line, while on the other hand, the antitrust doctrine indicates
that if you fall over that line it is a terribly long first step.
418 Vol. 21:411
